Adverse Health Effects of Asbestos: A Historical Account

Asbestos is an incombustible and naturally occurring mineral. Due to its exceptional physical properties, it has assumed a wide variety of uses such as insulation of boilers, steam pipes, fireproof vests to mention but a few (Brodeur 1985). Despite its many useful applications, asbestos has many disadvantages especially for those who are directly involved in making it into useful forms – the factory workers. Without proper ventilation in the factories where workers are directly exposed to the dust particles from asbestos, there is a high probability of getting asbestosis (Selikoff, Churg et al. 1984, Cassingham 1985, Vena, Byers et al. 1985). Asbestosis is caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust as a result of one’s proximity to the mineral with workers being the most at risk population. The inhaled dust affects the cells of the lungs and over time, hardens the organ. Since this is not the natural state of the lung, it results in labored breathing among other respiratory complications (Selikoff, Churg et al. 1984, Cassingham 1985, 1988). Over time, some affected individuals develop a malignant cancer called mesothelioma (Cassingham 1985, By 1987). Besides the toll that the exposure takes on one’s health, the consequent financial burden as a result of treatment, loss of income as a result of illness, physical incapacitation and distress can be stressful.

The early to mid-1900s saw some of the most dramatic events related to asbestos’ rise in the industrial sector as a useful mineral. In that same period there were many changes made and studies conducted that supported the notion that asbestos was indeed to be handled with care if its health consequences were to be curtailed (1986). In England for instance, Dr. Merewether conducted a study between 1928 and 1929 with asbestos-textile workers. His study provided evidence that increased exposure to asbestos dust had a direct correlation with the incidence of asbestosis (Brodeur 1985). These findings led to legislative action which saw compensation of affected parties and continuous medical examinations for workers. It was not until the 1930s that the first case of asbestosis was confirmed in the United States by autopsy (Brodeur 1985). This triggered an acute sense of awareness among the asbestos-textile industry workers and led to many lawsuits demanding justice. It caused such an uproar that even the Federal government had no choice but to seek redress in court as well (By 1988). Notable amongst them was the case involving the Federal government and Con Edison (By 1988). The government alleged negligence on the part of Con Edison in the transportation of asbestos products which led to the escape of asbestos dust thereby endangering the health of the public. In addition to that the company had failed to make known their asbestos removal activities and that constituted a violation of regulations set out by the government as a condition for the operation of their business. This came about as a result of workers’ complaint to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) since their health was directly affected by decisions of Con Edison management. Prior to this new suit, there had been several lawsuits by then current and former employees naming Con Edison as defendants and alleging unsafe working conditions through exposure to asbestos.

A similar lawsuit was filed by Charlotte Hammond, the wife of an employee of North American Asbestos Corporation for negligence and also failure to warn workers of the dangers of handling asbestos. Her husband had been diagnosed with asbestosis as a result of working for the company according to the lawsuit (By 1987). Together with her husband they were awarded one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars ($125,000) to compensate them for the emotional and financial stress the diagnosis had taken on them and an additional three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars ($375,000) in punitive damages against North American Asbestos Corporation for their failure and being negligent by not taking safety precautions to protect its employees.

There were many asbestos-related lawsuits and for good reason too considering the costs involved in suffering from the disease. It became a daunting task for the businesses involved. Financially, the asbestos industry was being drained badly. The burden placed on the companies like Johns-Manville, North American Asbestos Corporation among others had become unbearable because of all the lawsuits against them. In view of this, many companies were left with no choice but to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 (1982, Lewin 1984). The many lawsuits pending and those that were still being litigated were so many that by their projection, Manville would not be in existence if the plaintiffs were to be awarded the sums of money requested. Chapter 11 was enacted by congress to protect companies from liquidation. It was a combination of laws dating back to the year 1898. The uniqueness of Chapter 11 is this: it gave an affected entity a certain amount of say in negotiations with its creditors and protected the debtor from having to sell its assets in order to settle debts owed to its creditors (By 1983, By 1985). Another very attractive feature of the law was its ability to place an indefinite hold on all lawsuits filed against a particular company. It was this very thing that drew the major companies to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. A typical example was Amatex, an asbestos-textile manufacturing company. They filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 due to at least ten thousand (10,000) lawsuits pending against them and several more being filed on a monthly basis (1982). They also owed approximately twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) in legal fees to one law firm alone. This gives one an idea of how much loss the company was making. Prior to Amatex, the Manville Corporation had also filed for bankruptcy. It sent shockwaves all over the corporate world due to the fact that it was considered the leading asbestos manufacturing company in the world at that time (By 1982). The lawsuits filed against Manville Corporation numbered sixteen thousand (16000) and several more were expected. According to a New York Times article published in 1982, the projected cost of the lawsuits would be approximately two billion dollars ($2,000,000,000) and that necessitated the decision to file for bankruptcy (1982) . Filing for bankruptcy did not mean that the company was going to be out of business. It only meant that they had been given the chance under Chapter 11 to re-plan their finances. At the same time it prevented lawsuits from being filed against them thereby effectively ending any compensatory payouts to potential plaintiffs (By 1983). Attorneys representing the aggrieved workers asked the Bankruptcy court to deny Manville’s request because it was in ‘bad faith’ (By 1982, By 1983). According to the New York Times reporter, it would be difficult to show that the company’s request was being done in ‘bad faith’ rather than in the interest of the plaintiffs because the law had no item or criteria that fit that a scenario of that nature and therefore how to proceed in the event of such an occurrence. Attorneys for the claimants believed that Manville had manipulated their documents to give the impression that their finances were not in a good enough position to satisfy the requests of the suits brought against them (By 1984). The studies upon which the decision to file for bankruptcy was based was also challenged (By 1982). Furthermore, the attorneys suggested that Manville had been silent about the harmful health effects of asbestos dust and did nothing to safeguard the health of its employees. Many similar businesses faced similar fates and followed Manville and Amatex’s example. Due to the volume of suits being reported, there were fears that the insurance companies and Manville creditors could be affected (By 1981, By 1982) – a chain reaction involving not only businesses involved in the manufacture of asbestos and asbestos products but also their associates such as the insurance companies. Fortunately for Manville, the court sided with them and saw reason to grant their request to file for bankruptcy (By 1984). It came as an unpleasant surprises to the aggrieved workers who were now left to the mercy of the company due to the judge’s decision to appoint a representative for them. Although it sounds like a brilliant idea, it essentially limited how much financial compensation they would be entitled to because the judge made Manville only partially responsible for future lawsuits (By 1984).

Just one year after filing for bankruptcy, it came to light that The Manville Corporation was thriving quite well. They were not responsible for all those lawsuits and had basically used the bankruptcy protection law to its advantage by ensuring they would not be responsible for any payouts (By 1983). The company claimed even though they were doing well financially, they still owed an awful lot of money to the banks with whom they do business (By 1983). Regardless, it was widely seen as a way for Manville to escape the consequences of shunning the responsibility they owed their hardworking employees while still staying in business. The company stayed in bankruptcy for a total of six (6) years (By 1987) during which some restructuring was conducted within the company. After emerging from bankruptcy there were two trusts set up to take care of damage to properties and health complications caused by exposure to asbestos by setting up trusts (By 1988, 1990).

The decision of the judge to appoint a representative to determine how much a future claimant was entitled to, was seen as a means to introduce a limit on claims. Prior to being approved for bankruptcy protection, Manville made this request of the court and it was the subject of much debate and outright rejection from the attorneys representing the plaintiffs and for good reason too. The representative would oversee a sum of money set aside by affected companies like Manville and Amatex to name but a few that will be used to compensate the injured workers (By 1983). Setting a cap of this nature solved certain financial problems for the companies. Considering the amounts of money that had to be paid out – ranging from fifty billion ($50,000,000,000) to two hundred billion dollars ($200,000,000) in asbestos-related liabilities (By 1982, By 1984) – there seemed to be a real impact on business and the economy in general if something was not done to contain the situation. Even though something needed to be done, what ended up happening – the cap – was certainly not in the interest of the workers; because they did not to have a say (By 1982) in how much they would be eligible for in the event of them developing asbestosis and associated health complications as a result of the negligence of the companies for whom they worked. It was not only unfair, but also goes against basic laws of reason, decency, and morality to have the companies partially responsible for something their own negligence caused. It was clear in the case of Manville, how the bankruptcy law helped them escape their responsibilities to the plaintiffs and eventually go on to have their requests upheld by the court.

There were studies going as far back as 1929 by Merewether that showed a relationship between asbestos exposure and later incidence of asbestosis. It had become well known in the 1960s that dust from asbestos was indeed a health hazard (Ringo 2004). It seems a little bit odd then for the major companies to deny knowledge of the health risks involved in exposure to asbestosis. Leading industry giants like The Manville Corporation and its subsidiary, Raybestos on several occasions denied knowledge of the effects that their products has on employees and the general public. Unfortunately, an uncovering of secret documents that was circulated among the top administrators and attorneys suggested that the company had been dishonest with the public, its employees and the courts for decades (1978). The documents specifically mention the fact that the adverse health effects of asbestos on the health of workers was known as far back as the 1930s (1978) and yet nothing was done by way of informing the employees probably for fear of creating panic and the company possibly losing their main source of labor. According to Bill Richards of the Washington Post, the executives had been forewarned of the dangers of asbestos related health complications after reviewing studies on the subject. There was also evidence of a deliberate concealing of information from the employees (1978, 1979). After commissioning studies into the effects of asbestos exposure, there was a series of concerted efforts on the part of the Johns-Manville Corporation, as they had become known at the time, to prevent a publishing of the results of the studies. So determined were the executives of the company that they were willing to fire their Asbestos specialist who was to advise them on the all issues asbestos related; and indeed he was let go because he did his job. The uncovering of these documents suggest a shocking level of irresponsibility and negligence on the part of the executives of the company. It also portrayed them as an unscrupulous and greedy group of administrators who valued profit over life.

The Fortune 500 asbestos manufacturing companies seemed to never run out of luck for there was yet another lifeline thrown their way regarding potential plaintiff’s ability to successfully bring a lawsuit against them. Unlike many states had done during the 1980s, New York was one of quite a handful that had not changed its statute of limitations regarding asbestos (Brodeur 1985). Adverse health outcomes due to exposure to asbestos often take a long time to manifest. The latency period differs for different people and it lasts anywhere from about one to five decades (Liddell 1981, Green 1988). The statutes of limitations at the time in the state of New York was such that an affected person could file a toxic tort lawsuit against another entity if only there is enough proof that their condition was a direct result of their last exposure to asbestos (Brodeur 1985). This complicated matters for the plaintiffs because it meant that even though they had been exposed to asbestos since they started working a particular factory, the law does not take into account the period of initial exposure and the subsequent repeated daily exposures that followed during their time of employment. Although there were efforts to amend the law, the political will to do so was not there; this was evident in the conditions placed on the amendment which essentially set a cap and excluded those who would otherwise have the backing of the law to sue the Manville Corporation (Brodeur 1985). In the state of Virginia, the statute of limitations required a plaintiff to file a lawsuit within two years of exposure (1982). For this reason, the Johns-Manville Corporation saw an opportunity to once again use the legal system to their advantage. They appealed a decision that made it possible to have five of their former employees bring a suit against them. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of the plaintiffs. The chances of the case going the way of Manville Corporation would have been good; unfortunately the court determined that the statutes of limitation was not applicable because their work came under ‘admiralty jurisdiction’ (1982).

Many studies together with the growing number of lawsuits forced lasting changes within the industry and many places where asbestos could be found such as in schools and workplaces There were very important studies conducted into the adverse health effects of asbestos. A few of the studies and reports published between 1960 through 1985 are discussed below together with the findings made by the investigators.

In a January 1973 issue of the journal Occupational Health Nursing, asbestos was reported to be the cause of approximately two thousand (2000) deaths per year (Anonymous 1973). The publication identified evidence from studies that suggested that family members of asbestos-textile workers as well as those living in close proximity to mines were likely to suffer the consequences of asbestos fiber inhalation (Hueper 1965, Anonymous 1973, By 1984, Selikoff, Churg et al. 1984, By 1987, Reid, Kielkowski et al. 1990). This prompted the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to encourage asbestos-textile manufacturing businesses to take certain necessary precautions to reduce the amount of asbestos dust in the environment (Bignon, Brochard et al. 1982) and including but not limited to asbestos-textile factories, schools and federal buildings. More studies during the same period supported the idea that increased exposure to asbestos – especially those working in direct contact with it - were highly likely to develop cancer of the lung, and subsequently die of its complications (Newhouse 1969, Wagner, Berry et al. 1982). Other studies showed that certain types of fibers like chrysotile resulted in a fewer number of deaths (Newhouse and Sullivan 1989) as opposed to crocidolite, amosite and amphibole (Merchant 1990) as long as the conditions under which manufacturing took place was ideal; where ideal implies a considerable reduction of asbestos dust.

One of the more rigorous reports that showed a real difference in lung cancer levels as a result of asbestos exposure was carried out by the Occupational Health division of the U.S. Public Health Service. Surveillance data was obtained from the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the study subjects consisted of former asbestos-textile factory workers. It included cotton textile workers as the comparison group given the fact that they were similar in socioeconomic status, and working conditions (Newhouse and Sullivan 1989) to the asbestos factory workers.

The outcome of data collation and analysis are displayed in Table 1. The table shows the standardized mortality rates, expected and observed mortalities categorized by cause for both groups – asbestos factory workers and cotton textile factory workers. According to the data, there was a significantly higher death rate for asbestos workers as compared to cotton textile workers (Newhouse and Sullivan 1989). Under the cancer related deaths category, the table shows that there were a lot more respiratory cancer deaths for the asbestos factory workers as compared to the cotton textile workers. Similarly in a cohort study conducted in South Carolina, which consisted of two thousand five hundred and forty-three (2543) participants, sought to find evidence showing that asbestos in general had to be handled with a few precautions. The aim was to determine the end result of type of mineral fiber on mesothelioma, cancer of the respiratory tract and asbestosis (McDonald, Fry et al. 1983). According to the study, approximately 34% of the participants who worked in an asbestos factory from the year 1938 to 1958 had passed away before 1977 (McDonald, Fry et al. 1983). The expected death rate due to cancer of the respiratory tract was exceeded by about thirty (30) deaths. In comparison to chrysotile, however, there were far fewer deaths. Through animal studies it had become known that chrysotile was a comparatively less dangerous fiber than other types of asbestos fibers (Pott, Friedrichs et al. 1976).

The adverse health effects of asbestos prompted Congress to pass laws that would protect the health of citizens. The United States Senate therefore passed an act which required the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to ensure the proper removal of asbestos from identified schools. Prior to that, the only program in place at the EPA was to bring the attention of school officials to the existence of asbestos in the schools but not required to remove them (1986). The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 was meant to accomplish three main objectives (Newhouse 1969). The most important among them was to come up with a set of criteria meant to determine whether there is a presence of hazardous asbestos material in particular schools. The bill also required that for any company to undertake projects to install asbestos-related products in schools, that they be approved by the state. In addition to that, all schools were required to abide by the above stipulations for the sake of the public’s health (Newhouse 1969). Congressional action in response to adverse health effects of asbestos began prior to the 1986 Act. Due to the negative health impacts associated with asbestos that had been discovered, the Senate held hearings to determine how best the Environmental Protection Agency was carrying out its duties to ensure minimal exposure of schoolchildren and school employees to asbestos (1978, By 1987, By 1987). This prompted action on the part of the EPA to ensure that schools were safer for kids and teachers alike (By 1985, By 1987, By 1987).

Another bill was introduced in Congress by James Joseph Florio. The aim of the new bill was to reinforce the provisions of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986. Rightly named The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Amendments, it sought to extend the requirements of the previous bill to cover all buildings in which government business is conducted and also private buildings as well (Knox, Holmes et al. 1968). The bill required special training for individuals who would be tasked with getting rid of exposed asbestos-containing products (Knox, Holmes et al. 1968). There were additional requirements such as, ensuring the proper conveyance and discarding of asbestos-containing waste. Perhaps the most important improvement to the bill was the addition of an Asbestos Abatement Scientific Commission (Knox, Holmes et al. 1968). This body was to be made up of scientifically qualified experts who would be tasked with making recommendations as to the safest way to handle the removal of asbestos and asbestos dust as and when it becomes necessary in any of the buildings specified – federal, private and school buildings. The bill named the National Academies of Science and Engineering as the body that would be responsible for selecting the Commission while Congress in conjunction with the President would be the ones to formally appoint them. This was a step in the right direction considering the fact that in schools for instance, exposure to asbestos posed a grave danger to the future leaders of the nation and this bill was necessary to ensure that the children are protected at all costs.

Some parents feared that there was too little effort on the part of school authorities and New York’s State Division of Environment and Epidemiology (Wald 1993). Given the dangers health and financial burden involved with the exposure to asbestos, one cannot really fault them. Although asbestos has many useful applications, the improper handling of it led to many avoidable errors (1978, By 1988) going as far back as the 1960’s, ‘70s and 80s from which lessons can be learnt in order not to repeat those same errors.